This article is written by Astha Tripathi, a law student at Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda, Faculty of Law, with a keen interest in Environment law, Constitutional law, Jurisprudence, Administration law.
This article explores the implications of the Supreme Court’s advisory opinion of 2025 on the Governor’s and President’s power over Bills, as per the relevant constitutional articles (200 and 201). The article asks to what extent can the Supreme Court’s decision to refuse to impose a time-limit on the withholding assent and its simultaneous dismissal of the very idea of “deemed assent” fail to resolve the tension between the plenary authority of the central and state legislatures, on the one hand, and the separation of powers principle, on the other. By examining the Court’s opinion in the light of the relevant constitutional texts, this article aims to contribute to the understanding of how far the Indian Constitution allows the executive to obstruct the passage of statutes in order to score political points by dragging out the legislative process. The Supreme Court’s ruling on the advisory opinion concerning assent to Bills in 2025 is momentous for the Indian constitutional law because it tackles the difficult question of the President’s and Governor’s “withholding assent” in the context of the separation of powers. While the Court correctly declined to impose a time-limit on the President’s and Governors’ withholding assent, its dismissal of the concept of “deemed assent” does not entirely answer the question of to what extent can the President and Governor exploit their uniquely plenary legislative powers in the Indian Federation.
Introduction
The dispute over the constitutionality of the advisory opinion of the Supreme Court of India in 2025 was caused by the prolonged inaction of the President and Governors concerning Bills passed by State Legislatures and presented for their assent. The controversy arose from the tension between the democratic principle of popular sovereignty expressed in the Acts of the elected State Legislators and the authority of the President and Governors to withhold assent to such Acts under certain circumstances established by the Constitution of India.
According to Article 200 of the Constitution of India, when a Bill is passed by a State Legislature, the Governor of the State shall either give assent to it, withhold assent, or refer it to the President for his or her consideration or return it to the Legislature with a message asking for its reconsideration. At the same time, according to Article 201, when a Bill is referred to the President for his or her assent, he or she may either approve the Bill or refuse his or her assent thereto and, in addition, the President may direct the Governor to return the Bill to the Legislature for reconsideration.
Constitution of India does not explicitly specify the time limits for the acts of the President and Governors, which causes some controversy regarding the principle of democratic governance, constitutional order, and rule of law. In other words, the Constitution does not mention any specific deadlines for the acts of the constitutional authorities, but the prolonged inaction on the part of the President and Governors may impede the functioning of democratically elected Legislatures, as the latter is unable to enact laws without the assent of the Governor or President.
The aforesaid circumstance led the Supreme Court of India to the necessity to issue an advisory opinion in order to settle a dispute over the contested interpretation of the relevant constitutional articles. Indeed, the reference to the Supreme Court asked the latter to decide whether the silence of the Constitution in relation to the time limits for the actions of the President and Governors did not violate the principle of democratic governance and the rule of law. In order to respond to this complex constitutional question, the Supreme Court was to evaluate whether the rule of law did not require the President and Governors to promptly exercise their constitutional powers as the inaction of the aforementioned constitutional authorities in relation to Bills passed by State Legislatures could prevent democratic governance and disturb the federal division of powers.
Constitutional Setting
The provisions of articles 200 and 201 of the constitution are meant to govern the assent to bills passed by the state legislatures. In accordance with article 200, the Governor can either assent to or withhold assent from the bill passed by the legislature or reserve it for the consideration of the President or even return it for reconsideration by the legislature if it is not a money bill. The process set out in article 200 is then followed when the legislature re-submits the bill to the Governor for his or her assent. In addition, article 201 gives the procedure for bills that are reserved for the President as provided in article 200. It directs that the President must either give assent to the bill or withhold the assent and in some instances return the bill to the legislature for reconsideration.
The provisions of articles 200 and 201 are in a way designed to counteract various factors while at the same time preventing the Governor and the President from acquiring the unconstitutionally power to veto the decision of the elected members of the legislature. Indeed, the controversy surrounding the articles emanates from the question of the power of veto and not whether the power is contained in the constitution but rather whether the power can be used to deny assent to or defeat bills passed by the state legislatures with a simple majority.
The 2025 Reference
The constitutional issues were raised before the Supreme Court by way of Presidential Reference under Article 143 of the Constitution which provides that the President may refer to the Supreme Court any question of law or fact for its opinion. The 2025 Reference thus sought clarification on the ambit of the powers of the Governor and the President under Articles 200 and 201. It specifically invited opinion on whether by judicial construction timelines for exercising the powers provided under these articles could be read into the Constitution and if the doctrine of deemed assent was justiciable.
The dispute was in the wake of prolonged tussles over the assent to bills passed by State Legislatures. While there was a need to resolve disputes over the exercise of the power of assent, reservation and withholding of assent, the Supreme Court was called upon to go beyond a transactional resolution of disputes and provide clarificatory opinions on law and fact so as to guide future governance consistent with the spirit and letter of the Constitution.
The Court’s Holding
The Court held that the timelines for action by the Governor and President under articles 200 and 201 could not be prescribed by courts of law. In addition, the Court ruled that the “deemed assent” theory was unconstitutional. The opinions held that the process under article 200 and 201 was a dialogic process and not an adjudicative one. It further held that article 142 of the Constitution could not be used to undertake matters reserved for any of the other organs of state.
The Court’s ruling has a bearing on both doctrines and institutions. With regard to doctrines, the ruling indicates that the courts cannot go beyond their constitutional mandate of construing the law. By holding that the “deemed assent” theory was unconstitutional, the Court indicated its disapproval for any attempt to read further meanings into the Constitution beyond what is stated there. In terms of institutions, the Court’s ruling ensured that the separation of powers would be maintained. By refusing to allow the “deemed assent” theory, the Court prevented matters that were constitutionally reserved for the executive from being turned into administrative matters by the judiciary.
Textual Interpretation
A strong argument can be made in favor of the Court’s interpretation. The provisions of Articles 200 and 201 state clearly what decisions the President may make in any given decision, but neither of the articles stipulate time limits or penalties for not making a decision. From one perspective, this could be seen as an intentional omission by the Framers, which would make the issue a matter of judgment for the Court.
However, such judgment should not be made with the disregard of the timing aspect. The bigger question which the case raises is whether in determining a decision a decision-making power should also be attributed to a responsibility to make it in a timely manner or if its perpetual deferral would not be a “decision” anymore. This tension seems to be the main issue in the case.
Federalism and Legislative Will
The assent process has a distinctively federal dimension in that State legislation is significantly influenced by the conduct of the Governor, and by the President in the reserved cases. In a parliamentary system, it is normal for the elected legislature to have its passed bills either assented to, returned to the legislature, or explicitly vetoed by the Head of State. A prolonged period of silence on a particular bill may serve to thwart the elected legislature’s will by an unelected authority, and this should not be the case.
It is this very consideration that makes the current impasse not a matter for the technicalities of parliamentary procedure, but a constitutional issue of the interaction between democratically and non-democratically elected officials. By creating a situation in which the will of the elected legislature cannot be effectively implemented by the Governor, the President has placed the Union’s integrity in jeopardy, as far as the States are concerned, and has exacerbated the tension between the two.
Judicial Restraint and its Limits
The Court’s refusal to impose timelines reflects a familiar principle of constitutional restraint. If the Constitution does not expressly provide deadlines, a court may hesitate to create them, especially in an area involving high constitutional functionaries. The advisory opinion therefore preserves the formal boundary between interpretation and amendment.
At the same time, the refusal leaves a difficult gap. If a Governor or President simply delays action for an extended period, and if courts cannot prescribe fixed deadlines, what constitutional remedy remains? The opinion suggests that courts may not intervene by inventing “deemed assent,” but it does not fully settle the question of whether extreme, unexplained inaction could ever justify a limited mandamus or other constitutional response in an exceptional case.
Democratic Accountability
The most glaring error in the opinion is the democratic cost of suspension. A bill passed by a State legislature is the product of a deliberative process and the accountability of democracy. By withholding assent through silence, the public is denied the opportunity to understand why its democratically elected legislature cannot act.
It is for this reason that the opinion suggests that such a prolonged withholding of assent may be characterized as a “silent veto.” The phrase itself implies a constitutional fiction, for there is no provision in the constitution for such a veto. Nevertheless, the very fact that it has been suggested shows that such a problem may arise. It is for this reason that the constitution has to address this issue and provide an answer to the normative question, given a prolonged withholding of assent, can the silence of the legislature be converted into a veto?
Supporting Authority
The principal authority for this opinion is, of course, the Supreme Court’s own 2025 advisory opinion in the reference posed to it. Beyond that, however, the opinion is informed by a detailed analysis of the relevant constitutional texts, particularly Articles 200 and 201 of the Constitution Act, which delineate the respective options open to the Governor and President, and Article 143, which enacts the very existence of the advisory jurisdiction by which this particular reference was initiated.
Most importantly, perhaps, this opinion was occasioned by a dispute of far wider interest than merely the anomaly of one state’s Bills. It had implications for the proper interpretation of the Constitution in all spheres, and hence had ramifications for both legislation and practice at all levels, including in the everyday functioning of the various state governments.
Counter Arguments
The best defense of the Court’s methodology is that judicially imposed timelines may have more of a distancing effect on the Constitution than a restoring one. To the extent that the Constitution does not say that something must be done by a certain time, its omission may be said to legislate unwisely. The same could be said for deemed assent; by turning inaction into an affirmative decision, the Court would be rewriting the Constitution.
That criticism, however, is not an entirely adequate response to the defenders of the status quo. There is no doubt that the original Constitution leaves ample room for procrastination to undermine the will of the people, but a constitution that leaves such glaring loopholes ought to be interpreted in a manner that limits those weaknesses. In other words, the Court should be guided by a philosophy of restoration tempered with appropriate judicial restraint.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s 2025 advisory opinion provides India with a much needed clarification as to the constitutional procedure in cases concerning the Governor and the President. In its decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the courts cannot impose time limits on the Governor or the President and that they cannot go beyond the Constitution in declaring assent to bills passed by the legislative assembly. This is a welcome clarification that upholds the separation of powers as envisioned by the Indian Constitution and protects the autonomy of the executive as envisioned by Articles 200 and 201.
However, the ruling only partially addresses the issue as it leaves open the question of what should happen if a constitutional authority refuses to grant assent to a bill passed by the legislature. The ruling is thus both a cautionary tale about the dangers of overreach by the judiciary and a warning about the vulnerabilities of the Indian federal system.
